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I. Introduction
Chronic inflation is characterized by long periods (i.e., several
decades) of high (relative to industrial countries) and persistent ,·inflation
(Pazos, 1972). The phenomenon of chronic inflation emerged in several Latin
American countries after World War II, and has been a distinguishing feature
of the economic landscape of several countries ever since. After numerous
failed attempts, some countries have succeeded to reduce inflation close to
international levels (Argentina, Chile, Israel, and Mexico).
There is a rich history of stabilizatj~ons in chronic inflation
countries, which spans more than three decades. This provides a unique
opportunity to identify the main patterns of adjustment and examine
11 This outline has been prepared to be discussed at the conference on
"Inflation Stabilization: The Recent Experience in Latin America," organized
by the Central Bank of Uruguay, to be held on August 8-9, 1994. The views
expressed her~ are those of the authors arid do not necessarily represent
those of the IMF.
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econometrically some of the main features of disinflation in chronic
inflation countries. Our study is based on 17 stabilization plans from 1964
to the present in 7 countries: Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
Israel, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay (see Table 1). Twelve of these programs
were based on the use of the exchange rat,~ as the nominal anchor, while 5
were based on the use of a monetary aggregate.
In addition to reviewing the main "stylized facts" for these 17
stabilization plans (in the spirit of Kigne1 and Liviatan (1992), Vegh
(1992), and Calvo and Vegh (1994)), we resort to different econometric
exercises and thus are able to provide sm~e rigorous econometric basis for
several key features of disinflation in cllronic inflation countries.
II. Empirical regularities
This section reviews the main empirieal regularities of exchange rate-
based and money-based programs. These are:
1. Inflation converge only slowly to the rate of growth of the nominal
anchor (Chart 1).
2. The real exchange rate appreciates in both exchange rate-based and
money-based programs (Chart 2).
3. In exchange rate-based programs, there is an initial boom in
economic activity (real GDP and consumption) followed by a later
contraction. In money-based programs, the recession occurs at the beginning
of the programs (Table 2).
4. The external accounts (trade and current account) worsen in
exchange rate-based stabilizations.
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5. The capital account improves sub!;tantially in exchange rate-based
stabilizations (although external factors seem to play an important role),
see Table 3. A similar story applies to stock markets (Chart 4). The boom
in asset markets is not limited to the equity market, but is also evident in
real estate prices, which tend to rise throughout the program.
6. International reserves appear to increase substantially in both
exchange rate-based and money-based stabilization, with the resulting
accumulation being more pronounced in periods of heavy capital inflows
(Chart 3 and Table 3). The accumulation of reserves in money-based
programs suggests considerably intervention in foreign exchange rate
markets, which may reflect an unwillingness to let the real exchange rate
appreciate.
7. Real interest rates have increased in the initial stages of money
based-stabilization. In exchange rate-based stabilizations, real interest
rates have generally fallen in orthodox pl~ograms (although in Chile they
remained at very high levels) and increased in heterodox programs (Table 4).
8. The fiscal stance varies considel~ably across programs. In
successful programs, there is a substantial fiscal tightening. In other
cases, however, the fiscal outcome may simply reflect the pick-up in
economic activity and the resulting increase in tax revenues (Table 5), as
emphasized by Talvi (1994).
III. Inflation Stabilization and Economic Growth
Both theory and casual evidence suggest that exchange rate-based
-----_._-_ ..-_.- •.._.~~-----------------
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stabilization programs have been characterized by a boom-bust pattern in
economic activity, particularly private consumption. Money-based plans are
associated with and initial recession followed by recovery in economic
activity. The evolution of real GDP growth and consumption growth shown in
Table 2 highlights the marked differences in the so-called "inflation-
output" tradeoff between the two types of plans. The more systematic
econometric treatment discussed below also lends support to the "recession
now versus recession later hypothesis".
A panel of seven countries which have collectively implemented
seventeen inflation stabilization plans o,rer the last thirty years was used
to test if mean rates of growth in real GDP are statistically different
during inflation stabilization plans. The sample is 1964-1993 and the
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru,
and Uruguay. The results are robust to variations in the estimation
technique; the fixed-effects estimates are presented in Table 6.
The main results are:
1. The mean rate of growth increases in the early stages of an
exchange rate-based plan: the estimated irLcrease is about 2.3 percent and
statistically significant.
2. During the last year of the program, a recession ensues. Note
that these estimates do not imply an output decline of 5.4 percent, but a
decline of 1.8 percent (5.4 below the mean growth rate of 3.6). The
difference in growth in the final year of the program is also statistically
significant.
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3. The mean rate of real GDP growth falls by about 5.4 percent in
the early phases of money-based programs. There is also evidence of a later
rebound in economic activity, but (unlike the early recession) this
difference is not significant.
4. The cumulative effect on output of an exchange rate-based
stabilization plan varies considerably as the duration of the plan varies.
As Table 7 illustrates, given the magnitude of the late recession, the level
of output ends up being lower for plans lasting three years or less. Short-
lived plans are costly.
5. More generally, the evidence suggests that output is not
invariant to th~ policy regime, as suggested by some of the recent
endogenous growth literature.
IV. How effective are the nominal anchors?
The speed and magnitude of the decline in inflation depends crucially
on a multitude of institutional factors as well as on macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies. The analysis that follows does not attempt to trace
out the various transmission mechanisms through which the nominal anchor
(the exchange rate or money) affect prices. Rather, the emphasis is on
examining the "reduced-form" dynamic interaction between these two variables
during selected stabilization plans. The goal is to assess how quickly a
policy shock is transmitted to.inflation, and thus make statements about the
presence or absence of inflation inertia and the effectiveness of policy.
A total of 11 plans are examined (nine exchange-rate based and two
money-based) .. A bivariate vector autoregi:ession (VAR) using monthly
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inflation rates and devaluation rates is estimated for the exchange rate-
based plans; money growth (Ml) and inflation define the system for the
money-based plans. The period of estimation covers only the duration of the
plan, hence it is free from the parameter inconstancy that is at the heart
of the Lucas critique. We evaluate, the effectiveness of policy at two
levels.
First, we determine if there is a systematic and significant causal
relationship between the nominal anchor and the target variable, inflation.
Significant causality is necessary but not sufficient for policy to be
effective, since the impact may be significant but quantitatively small.
"For instance, one would expect the pass-through from exchange rates to
prices to depend on the openness of the economy, the degree of indexation,
the extent of credibility, and so on. Secondly, to assess the issue of
quantitative importance as well as speed of adjustment we examine the impact
on inflation of a hypothetical tempo.rary s:hock to the nominal anchor.
The main results can be summarized as foll,ows:
1. In eight out of the nine exchange rate-based programs there is
a significant causality from the rate of devaluation to the rate inflation
(Table 8). The exception is the Argentine 1967 plan, where the fixity of
the rate resulted in serious collinearity problems. The recent
Convertibility plan also shows some of the same problems. As one would
expect with an exogenous policy instrument, the exchange rate is not
affected by past (or current) inflation with the exception of Israel. Money
also appears exogenous during the money-based plans considered. However,
significant causality from money growth to inflation was detected in the
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Chilean 1975 plan. Thus, causal patterns appear to be constant across
countries and across time.
2. In six of the nine episodes examined, past inflation
significantly affected current inflation, indicating systematic inflation
inertia. The inertial behavior was most pronounced in Chile, Mexico, and
Israel.
3. Charts 5-8 plot the response of monthly inflation to a
reduction in the rate of devaluation (or money growth) at an annual rate of
20 percent lasting 12 months. Note that:
a) The smallest impact on inflal:ion is seen in the plans of the
1960s, where inflation falls by 13.6 perceIlt for Argentina and only 10
percent for Uruguay (this is the lowest response in our sample). It may
possibly be reflecting the relatively closed nature of the economy at that
time.
b) The maximum effectiveness is reached in the Tablita plans,
where the decline in inflation ranges from 113.5 percent for Argentina to 22
percent for Uruguay, with Chile in the middle. Further, the decline in
inflation for the cases of Argentina and Uruguay is fairly sudden. These
two observations possibly suggest that the m)sence of more significant
declines in inflation in these programs may l:lavehad more to do with "policy
inertia" rather than with "inflation inertia". The inflation inertia
argument appears to find more support in the Chilean data, as it takes a
year for inflation to decline to its minimum level.
c) The exchange rate pass-through appears to decline in the 1980s
and 1990s. For the four exchange rate-based programs, the maximum decline
----------------------------------------------------
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in inflation in response to a twenty percent reduction in the rate of
devaluation ranges from 11 percent for Mexico to 15 percent for the
Argentine Convertibility plan. This result remains puzzling. Perhaps
greater indexation and/or lower credibility may account for this change.
The time (in months) it takes to reach the minimum ranges from 3 months for
Uruguay to 14 months for Israel.
d) With regard to the money-based plans, the response to the
shock for both Chile and the Dominican Republic is gradual, taking 12-15
months to reach its most pronounced effect~ The inertia is also evident in
the Chilean 1975 money-based plan, where It takes a year for inflation to
decline by about 14 percent. Possibly, the more delayed effects may reflect
the inherent difficulties in monetary con1:rol.
e) Based on three indicators of inertia (the significance of past
inflation, the response to a temporary policy shock, and the speed of
adjustment) for the more recent peri?d, I~:rael and Mexico and, to a lesser
degree Chile, stand out as the countries in which inflation inertia has been
most pervasive. On the other hand, in Argentina, the Dominican Republic and
to a lesser extent, Uruguay, inflation inertia does not appear to be that
much of a problem. The results also highlight that the interaction between
instrument and target, not only vary across countries (which is obvious),
but can change markedly across time.
Table 1. Major Inflation Stabilization Plans
Plan Pori 0 d
Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization Plans
Orthodox plans
Argentine tablita
Chilean tablita
Uruguayan tablita
Convertibility Plan (Argentina)
Uruguay 1991
1978:12 - 1981:2
1978:2 - 1982:6
1978: 10 - 1982: 10
1991:4 - present
1991: 1 - present
Heterodox plans
Argentina 1967
Austral (Argentina)
Brazil 1964
Cruzado (Brazil)
Israel 198511 .
Mexico 19871/
Uruguay 1968
1967:3 - 1970:10
1985:6 - 1986:9
1964:3 - 1968:8
1986:2 1986: 11
1985:7 - 1990:6
1987: 12 - 1992:2
1968:6 -1971:12
Money-Based Stabilization Plans
BONEX (Argentina)
Collor (Brazil)
Chile 1975
Dominican Republic
Peru
1989:12 - 1991:1
1990:3 -1991:1
1975:4 - 1977: 12
1990:8 - present
1990:8 - present
1/These are successful programs, hence the termInal date has been arbitrarily
set to five ye ars.
Table 2. Inflation Stabilization:
Real GDP
( •.nou- .•.l rAt. of growth, in peroent)
Proc; r.a.Dl
thr ••
yeAr. Year
belor. Firat. Second Third proqr •.•
ergST"" Iter Year refT ended
Exchange Rate-Based Plans
Argentina 1967
Argen tine Tablita
Argen tina (Austral)
Arg en tine Coovertib ility
Brazil 1964
Brazil (Cruzado)
O1ilean Tablita
Israel 1985
MeXico 1987
Uruguay 1968
Uruguayan Tablita
Uruguay 1991
Average
6.5
-4.0
-0.4
-2.7
Money-based Plans
Argentina (Bono:)
Brazil (Collor)
O1ile 1975
Dominican Rep.1blic 1990
Peru 1990
Average
-1.8
24
-1.9
4.6
-3.9
-0.1
3.3
0.2
20
1.1
0.2
3.5
0.7
0.9
0.1
-4.4
-12.9
-5.4
-4.4
-5.4
0.8
7.1
7.3
8.9
26
7.6
8.2
4.0
1.2
1.1
6.2
0.0
4.8
8.7
23.1
8.3
3.6
3.3
6.3
6.0
5.3
7.1
3.3
0.7
4.9 26
-5.7
26
Growth and Consumption Cycles
Real Private Consumption
CAnna •. l rat. of qro'ttth, in percent)
'1'h r ••
Progra.JIl,
,. ••. ra r •• r
before Fir.t Second Third proqra.m
pro9£tm YeAr rear year ended
Exchange Rate- Based Plans
Argen tina 1967
Argentine TabIita
Argentina (Austral)
Argentine Coovertibility
Brazil 1964
Brazil (Cruzado)
O1ilean Tablita
Israel 1985
Mexico 1987
Uruguay 1968
Uruguayan Tablita
Uruguay 1991
Average
6.8
-4.2
1.2
-2.1
3.6
28
1.0
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.2
-5.3
0.5
3.5
-0.9
26
1.7
5.0
3.5 10.8
3.6
7.8 -14.1
6.1 1.3
4.4 26
4.8 -1.0
20 -9.6
5.0
4.6 -1.2
7.7
-2.8
25
Money-based Plans
0.9
9.9
Argentina (Bono:)
Brazil (Collor)
O1ile 1975
Dominican Rep.1blic 1990
Peru 1990
Average
-1.2
-0.5
-6.3
-0.3
1.5
-1.45.4
Hot •• J Dot_ lndi.c~t. the dAtA Are not .,..i.l.bl •• D•• h •• J.ndJ.oAt. d.t. do not .pp1r.
r11••• Are .ucce •• ful progrAII., h'.nee the eer1!in.l d,.t. b,.. b •• n .rbitr.ri.ly •• t to fi,... y •• r •.
On. r •• r b.for ••
loure • ., Buf",a" and z,.J.d.r",a" 0")1, Fav.ro and s.".J.on 0")1, /Ugu.l and z,J..,J.otan {l"'I,
z,u.tJ.g 0"21, x.d.lro. 11")/, ral.,J., {l"41, Vlano (1"01, Int.rnatJ.onal FlnanoJ.al ItatJ..tJ.ca IIXFI,
world S.'nJc t.bl •• , Fund~ci.on H.dit.zr~n ••. , nAtio'n.l .ourc •• , .nd Fund .e.ff •• e1".tt •••
26
14.4
7.9
15.7
3.3
6.4
7.5
14.8
1.8
8.2
9
-1.5
7.5
-1.8
-2.5
-11.4
-12.9
-15.3
-8.8
10.1
0.7
6.5
9
6.3
6.4
5
10.4
6.4
0.37.5
10.8
6.2
4.0
5.6
6.4 4.4
-3.6
0.7
4.0
4.3 10.2
-0.9
6.8 -12.1
4.3 0
5.7 4.9
24 -9.7
13
5.9 -0.5
3.9
16
-1.1
10.0
:pro9r~l'll
Table 3. The External Accounts
Current account balance excluding offk:ial transfers
Thrco
yeAr. Year
before rir.t Seoond Third pro9ra.m
proqram Y.a.r r."r r."r ended
Exchange Rate- Based Plans
Argentina 1967
Argentine Tablita
Argentina (Austral)
Argentine Convertibility
Brazil 1964
Brazil (Cruzado)
Chilean Tablita
Israe11985
Mexico 1987
Uruguay 1968
Uruguayan Tablita
Uruguay 1991
Average
1.4
0.5
-2.1
-1.4
-1.2
-2.3
-2.7
-3.3
0.7
1.7
-3.7
0.5
-1.3
Money- based Plans
Argentina (Bonex)
Brazil (Coilor)
Chile 1975
Dominican Republic 1990
Peru 1990
Average
-2.4
-0.3
-1.8
-5.9
-4.1
-2.9
1.0
-0.4
-2.7
-1.5
0.1
-2.1
-7.1
4.7
-2.2
1.4
-5.2
0.7
-2.1
1.3
-0.7
-5.8
-3.7
-4.3
-2.6
-0.3
-2.3
-3.7
0.4
-5.7
5.5
-2.9
0.9
-7.5
-1.8
-3.3
1.5
-3.3
-5.1
-2.3
-1.2
-3.3
-0.1
-7.1
-2.5
-3.2
-2.7
-4.5
1.1
-3.2
-2.6
-5.2
-3.9
-0.7
-2.8
-3.9
-0.8
-0.5
-9.5
-7.0
-2.8
-5.2
-4.7
-0.3
-4.1
-2.2
Capital balance including errors and omissions
(a.. a peroent of aOP)
proqra.JIl
Thro.
year. ~ear
before Tir.t S.cond Third proqraJl
progra.m Y.ar Year Year ended
Exchange Rate- Based Plans
Argentina 1967
Argentine Tablita
Argentina (Austral)
Argentine Convertibility
Brazil 1964
Brazil (Cruzado)
Chilean Tablita
Israel 1985
Mexico 1987
Uruguay 1968
Uruguayan Tablita
Uruguay 1991
Average
-1.0
-2.9
-6.0
-0.1
1.0
-0.7
3.1
-3.5
-1.3
Money- based Plans
Argentina (Bonex)
Brazil (Coli or)
Chile 1975
Dominican Republic 1990
Peru 1990
Average
-2.3
-2.8
-1.3
-0.0
-5.4
-2.3
Hot •• ' Dot. iDdloAt. tb. dAtA ~r. not AVA1JAbJ •• D •• h •• indicAt. d.tA do not Apply.
l/~h •• e Are .uoo ••• lul progrA~.J h.noe th. t.r.ln.J d.te b •• been .rbitrArily .et to lip. y •• r •.
$ourc •• , tnt~rnAtion.l FinAnoi.l 6tAti.tlo., And world Econnomic outlookJ tHF.
4.6
-1.6
-2.8
-6.4
22.4
-3.4
12.0
-2.8
2.4
-1.8
-2.0
-1.0
-13.6
-4.2
-4.5
-4.4
21.2
11.8
-7.2
4.3
3.8
13.0
7.0
7.9
10.2
3.4
- 3.0
2.6
-0.2
-6.8
-3.2
14.6
24.0
-6.0
7.0
5.4 15.2
18.4
7.4
3.6
-8.0
1.1
-1.6
12.0
5.2
Table 4. Real Interest Rates i.l Selected Stabilization Programs.
Real interest rates b
(in percent per year)
Four
Quarters First Last
before Four Four
Program Quarters Quarters
Programs Period a ~verage) (average) (average)
Exchange Rate- Based
Argentina 1967 1967-1970
Brazil 1964 1964-1968
Uruguay 1968 1969-1971
Argentine tablita 1979-1981 0.7 -2.8 5.9
Chilean tablita 1978-1982 70.9 43.0 46.4
Uruguayan tablita 1979-1982 18.2 -7.2 24.9
Austral (Argentina) C 1986 20.0 48.0 -7.5
Cruzado (Brazil) C 1986 -4.5 8.5 -9.5
Israel 1985d e 1986-1990 -2.0 21.2 11.0
Mexico 1987d 1988-1992 -2.9 292 2.0
Convertibility (Arg.) f 1991-1992 38.1 -2.0 4.0
Money-based
Chile 19759 1975-1977 127.2 58.0
Bonex (Argentina) 1990 -7.4 112.7
Collar (Brazil) h 1990 -8.1 -2.4
Dominican Rep. 1990 f i 1990-1992 15.1 13.7
Peru 1990 f 1990-1992 --17.3 235.0 48.1
.• Calendaryears during which the program was taken to be in effect for the purpOses
ofcurrentaccountfigure~ .
b Quarterly real lending rates unless otherwise indicated. Periods specified in
Tables 1 and 4 apply. Dots indicate data are not available. Dashes indicate data do not apply.
C Real interest rates are reported for two-quarter periods, and exclude the initial
price shock.
d Duration of program has been arbitrarily set to five years ..
••Real interest rate before the program refers to two quarters before.
f Program in progress.
g Annualreal interest rates.
/, Monthly averages of overnight interest rates on government securities. Real interest
rate after the program refers to first three quarters.
i Real interest rates for 1991.3 and 1991.4. Before January 1991, interest rates were
subje<:t to controls.
Sources: Bali no (1991), Barkai (1990), Bufman and Leider.nan (1993),
Castro and Rond (1991), Cukierman (1988), Kiguel and Liviatan (1989),
Perez-Campaneroand Leone (1991), International Enand:d Statistics (IMF),
and national sources.
Table 5. Public Sector Balance in Se!ec,ed Stabilization Program$ 1/
(as percentofGCP)
Three
Yean
before
Program Fint Second Third Fourth Fifth
Program$ Period 11 (average) Year Year Year Year Year
Exchange Rate-Ba$ed
Argentina 1967 1967-70 -4.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.5 -1.6 -4.1
Brazil 196431 1964-68 -4.0 -3.2 -1.6 -1.1 -1.7 -1.2
Uruguay 1968 1%9-71 -1.8 -2.5 -1.3 -5.8 -2.6
Argentine tablita 1979-81 -5.9 -4.7 -6.1 -8.5 -5.3
Chilean tabIita 1978-81 0.8 1.5 4.8 5.4 0.3 -4.0
Uruguayan tablita 1979-82 -1.4 (1.0 -0.3 -1.5 -9.1 -3.9
Austral (Argentina) 1986 -7.1 -2.0 -4.3
Cruzado (Bram) 1986 -3.9 -3.6 -5.5
Israel 19854/ 1986-90 -4.9 ~.3 0.0 -0.3 -4.0 -2.7
Mexican 198741 51 1988-92 -0.3 -4.5 -1.7 2.6 2.3 3.3
<Anvertibility (Arg.) 61 1991-93 -6.0 -0.9 0.6
Uruguay 1991 1991-93 -4.8 -0.9 -0.0 -1.6
Money-based
Chile 1975 1975-77 -20.1 -2.0 3.9 0.4 1.5
Bonex (Argen tina) 1990 -9.3 -2.3 -1.2
<Allor (Brazil) 51 1990 -5.8 1.4 1.5
Dominiean Rep. 199061 1991-92 -5.9 (1.1 1.6
Peru 19906/ 1991-92 -7.5 -2.6
Souces: Butman and Lelderman (1993), Corbo and SoIlmana (1,~1), 01 Tella and Dombusch (1989),
KlguelandLMatan(1989). Lemgrwer(1977). MedeIros (1993), RWlOS (1986), Wana (1990),
national sources, and Fwd staff estimales.
1/ OVerall balance of the non-financIal publIc sector, ur"less othuvJse IndIcated. A mInus sIgn
Indicates a deficit.
21 Calendar years duJing v.hlch program was In effed. If a progmm started earty
In the year. that year Is also Induded. Rgures reported up to one year after
the program ended. Dots Indicate data are not avaHable.
3/ Federal govemmeri .
.4/ Duration of the program has been arbltrarftiy set to five years.
Table 8. Causality and Exchanpe Rate Regimes
Plan and Sample Period
Inflation EqualJon
F-statistic Probability value
EXchange Rate EqualJon
F-statistic Probability value
Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization Plans
Argentina
1967 Plan: 1965:1 - 1972:6"'v
Inflation 1.257 (0.287) 1.039 (0.407)
Exchange Rate 0.980 (0.444) 0.380 (0.889)
Tablita: 1978:12 - 1981:2
Inflation 0.772 (0.926) 0.255 (0.975)
Exchange Rate 3.398 (0.051) 0.026 (0.399)
Convertibility Plan: 1991:4 - 1994:2v
Inflation 8.021 (0.001) 0.547 (0.654)
Exchange Rate 2.160 (0.115) 4.761 (0.008)
Chile
Tablita: 1978:2 - 1982:5
Inllation 26.283 (0.000) 1.480 (0.232)
Exchange Rate 4.765 (0.006) 3.706 (0.018)
Israel
1985:7 -1994:2
Inflation 10.509 (0.000) 6.193 (0.000)
Exchange Rate 2.655 (0.067) 3.449 (0.011)
Mexico
1987:12 - 1994:2
Inflation 6.988 (0.000) 1.324 (0.274)
Exchange Rate 4.533 (0.006) 4.544 (0.006)
~
1968 Plan: 1966:1 -1973:1211
Inflation 1.565 (0.203) 1.579 (0.200)
Exchange Rate 5.635 (0.001) 2.337 (0.079)
Tabrrta: 1978:10 -1982:10
Inllation 7.264 (0.000) 0.723 (0.634)
Exchange Rate 2.278 (0.057) 44.479 (0.000)
1991:1-1994:2
Inllation 0.568 (0.641) 2.139 (0.115)
Exchange Rate 2_349 (0.092) 1.250 (0.309)
Memo item:
Chile
Real Exchange Rate Target; 1985:7 -1991:12
Inllation 1.968
Exchange Rate 0.248
Foreign Inllation 1.054
(0.127)
(0.862)
(0.374)
3.880
0.632
2.266
(0.013)
(0.597)
(0.088)
Money-Based Stabilization Plans
Chile
1975:4 -1977:12
Inllation
Money (M1)
28.036
2.793
(0.000)
(0.060)
0.515
1.334
(0.676)
(0.284)
Dominican Republic
1990:8 - present
. Inflation
Money (Ml)
0.367
0.843
(0.587)
(0.938)
7.066
1.158
(0.000)
(0.371)
Notes: The optimal lag length was chosen according to the Schwarz: cJiteria Details are given in the appendix.
!/]hese plans fixed the exchange rate, hence for the duration of the plan it mimics the constant temJ of the regression
and a serious co/linearityproblem emerges. To attemt to capture (;period were the exchange rate eJdJibitssome
variability,we broadened the sample adding about two years of obmvations at both ends. This was not
feasible for the case of the convertibility plan, since the period imm<1diatelyduring preceeding it a money-bBsed
plan was In effect (sea Table 1)
'11-1lentho sample Is extended further back (to 1960:1), there is a ~ignificant causal relationship from the exchange
Table 6. Inflation Stabilization and Growth:
Evidence from Panel Data
(1964 - 1993)
Dependent
Variable:
Constant Stabilization Plans Dum mies
(M aan) Exchange rate
Ea,r1y Lata
Money
Early Late
Annual Growth Rate
in Real G DP
3.645
(0.518)
2.331
(1.037)
-5.454
(1.631)
-5.403
(1.931 )
1.822
(2.909)
Notes: The countries included in· the sample are Argentina. Brazil. Chile. Dominican Republic.
Mexico. Peru, and Uruguay. hence there are 210 observations. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The random effects estimates are reported.
Table 7. Output Effects of Exchange Rate-Based
Stabilization Plans as the Duratic,o' of the Plan Varies
Level of Real G DP at the end of year:
Beginning
of th e
End
of th e
program 2 3 4 5 pro gra m
100
100
100
100
100
102.331
102.331
102.331
102.331
102.331
104.716
104.716
104.716
104.716
96.7498
107.157
107.157
107.157
99.0051
109.655
109.655
101.312
112.211
103.674
106.091
Notes: These calculations reflect the difference in output due to the stabilization plan and
are based on the estimates reported In Table 6.
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the plan is given above each graph. The real excl:1ange rates are plotted for the
duration of the program. For the ongoing plans ~i.e. the Israeli and Mexican plans)
an arbitrary cut off of five years was chosen as th.: "end" of the plan.
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Chart 5. Exchango Ratos and Inflation: Programs of tho 1960s·
Effect of Temporary 20% Reduction in tho Rate of Devaluation
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Notes: Temporary refers to a chl'lnge lasting 12 months. Results of the estimated
equations aro summarized in Tables 8-9.
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF and the authors.
Chart 7. Exchange Rates and Inflation: Programs of the 19808 and 19908
Effect of Temporary 20% Reduction In the Rate of Devaluation
Percent Percent
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Chart 8_ Monoy and Inflation
Effoct of Tomporary 20% Reduction in tho Rate of Growth of Ml
Percent
2
o
-2
--4
-{l
-{l
-10
-12
-14
-16
-18
-20
Sample period:
1975:4 -1977:12
o 2 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 2S6 e
Number" of Monlhs
"2
o
-2
-4
-{l
-{l
-10
-12
-14
-16
-18
-20
Sam~pcriod:
1990:8 - 1993:10
Number of Months
Notes: Temporary refers to a change/asting 12 months. Results of the estimated
equations are summarized in Tables 8-9.
Sources: International Financial Statistics, /MF slid the authors.
